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Majeed's avatar

Super insightful

Stratabase's avatar

The "system prompt = public website" framing deserves a corollary for the entire context layer, not just system prompts. Anything you cache, anything you log for evals, anything you persist for retrieval is also potentially extractable — and the cache mechanics most teams don't think about make this worse than people realize.

Anthropic's prompt cache requires a 4,096-token minimum block on Haiku 4.5 — same as Opus, not the 1,024 that older docs imply. Below the threshold, the cache silently fails. Above it, the cached content is structured and persistent in ways that change the threat model. Teams that think they're not caching are; teams that are caching may be caching things they wouldn't have put in a system prompt voluntarily.

Most privacy threat modeling still treats the model as the dangerous component. The more interesting failure surface is the scaffolding around it — what you cache, what you log, what your retrieval store actually retains. That's the part the threat model is least mature for, and the part that's growing fastest as agent stacks get more complicated.

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